An Investigative Report on the Betrayal and Arrest of the Inhabitants of the Secret Annex

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I Introduction

One of the most frequently asked questions about the history of Anne Frank and the inhabitants of the Secret Annex is: *Who actually betrayed them?* This question continues to fascinate people. The Anne Frank House (AFH) still regularly receives suggestions, usually singling out specific individuals. These suggestions are always taken seriously but so far have not provided useful leads. And, of course, here at the Anne Frank House this question is always present in the background. In recent years, the AFH has made more of a commitment to focus on conducting its own research, so this matter is now part of the Knowledge Centre’s research program.

Premise and Background

This investigative report is based on the premise that only one thing can be agreed on with certainty: on August 4, 1944, members of the Sicherheitsdienst or SD (German Security Service) raided the building at 263 Prinsengracht and arrested ten people.

It is an assumption – granted a sound one – that this was *not a chance occurrence*. Obviously, the building had been selected for a reason. Yet, on what information that raid was based and how the SD got that information is still completely unclear. Whether this was a matter of betrayal, committed deliberately or not, is also an assumption. It remains to be seen if an analysis of the available data convincingly supports this decade-old theory.

Shortly after the liberation, Otto Frank and the helpers took steps to identify those who might have been responsible for the betrayal. The question of whether betrayal had taken place was not under discussion at that moment. In 1963, after the Austrian “Nazi-hunter” Simon Wiesenthal tracked down the former SS Officer Karl Joseph Silberbauer, the man who had led the raid on the Secret Annex, the assumption of betrayal seemed to be confirmed. Consequently, until now the literature on this subject has always focused on the question of *who?* It has long been assumed that a betrayer was out there who needed to be found. However, the sobering reality is that to date this avenue of thinking has yielded nothing conclusive.

Research Question and Sources

Considering the above, there is sufficient reason to be receptive to new perspectives and not to exclude other theories. Given what was just presented in the last paragraph, the proposed research question is: *Based on what information did the SD raid 263 Prinsengracht on August 4, 1944, and how did it acquire this information?* Both existing and previously unknown sources have been consulted to address this question. Earlier studies generally relied on source material from the files of the Centraal Archief van de Bijzondere Rechtspleging or CABR (Central Archives for Special Criminal Jurisdiction). Despite extensive research, no definitive leads have ever been found there, but information in these files can still be very helpful. Therefore, during this study, a lot of data was scrutinized again and compared with previously unknown or untapped sources. This material included police reports from Amsterdam, Zwolle, and Haarlem, as well as records from the judicial authorities in the latter two cities. In addition, the increasing digitization of data from municipal population registers has made it easier to access information and identify how people might be connected. The ongoing historical research done by the Anne Frank House in recent years has provided more understanding as well. These insights have also been applied while re-examining earlier ideas and theories.

Of course, in the analysis of all the related data, existing publications were also consulted. Over the years, several books have been released about the betrayal of people in hiding during the wartime occupation and how they were hunted down. Biographies about both Anne and Otto Frank also present different theories about the events leading up to the raid on August 4, 1944. Nonetheless, as the 2003 evaluation conducted by researchers David Barnouw and Gerrard van der Stroom of the NIOD (Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, previously the Dutch Institute for War Documentation) concludes, these theories do not stand up to scrutiny. An overview of the source material used for this investigation – published as well as unpublished – is included at the end of this report.
II The Raid

It is important to carefully illustrate how the raid and arrest took place. If this is even possible:
different statements, taken at different moments, tend to contradict each other. Moreover, through
the years, interpretations and additions have colored these statements—making it nearly impossible
to accurately describe the exact course of events. Primary sources are lacking. The earliest
information is from documents dating from shortly after the liberation. Important additions were made
in 1948, 1957, and 1963 when research on the arrest was done respectively by the Politieke
Recherche Afdeling or PRA (Political Investigation Branch), German journalist Ernst Schnabel, and
the Dutch and Austrian authorities. Despite the many ambiguities and contradictions, what follows
here is an attempt to faithfully describe the actual course of events that day. This account begins
with the arrival of the SD the morning of August 4, 1944. What might have happened leading up to
that moment follows later in this report.

Arrival
Around eleven o'clock in the morning, SS Hauptscharführer Karl Silberbauer and investigators
Gezinus Gringhuis and Willem Grootendorst entered the building. Jo Kleiman indicated this
timeframe in 1948, and Otto Frank corroborated it in 1963. Other than the three individuals
mentioned, the wording used by the witnesses allows for the possibility that more people were
present at that time. Yet, this can no longer be determined with certainty. According to Bep Voskuijl,
they pulled up out front in a car. One of the Dutch investigators exchanged a few words with the
warehouse workers and was referred to the office upstairs. There the investigators found the
company personnel at work: Johannes Kleiman, Bep Voskuijl and Miep Gies, who all knew about
the people in hiding. Victor Kugler, who also knew, was at work in a separate office space. He was
acting director of the firm Opekta—the main tenant in the building—and responsible for day-to-day
activities on the premises.

Searching the Building
Bep Voskuijl, who was not questioned by the PRA in 1948, said when asked in 1963 that a man
holding a gun came into the office. She presumed that at least five SD men must have been present,
because Kleiman later told her that five guns had been pointed at Kugler. But given Kleiman had
sent Bep out of the building with his wallet, she was not present for what happened next. In a 1946
letter—incorrectly dated “February 1945”—Kleiman wrote to the Politieke Opsporings Dienst or
POD (Political Criminal Investigation Department, predecessor of the PRA) that the men pointed
three guns at Kugler to force him to show them the “secret hiding place”. In a 1948 statement to the
PRA, Kleiman explicitly said that the SD men appeared to be “completely aware of the situation.”
It should be noted here that the SD told Kleiman to stay in his office, so he was not present for
Kugler’s interrogation or for the discovery of the door to the Secret Annex, one storey higher.
The statements given by Miep Gies, Victor Kugler, and the warehouseman Wim van Maaren from
the same PRA report do not provide conclusive information about what exactly happened in the
building. Asked about this again, by the German journalist Ernst Schnabel in 1957, Kugler wrote to
him saying he was ordered to show them around the entire building and had to open all sorts of

1 On November 10, 1945, Otto Frank identified the Dutch investigators from mug shots he looked through at the Bureau
Nationale Veiligheid (Bureau National Security); AFS, AFC, reg. code OFA, 072: O. Frank to Alice Frank-Stern, November 11,
1945. Jo Kleiman specifically mentioned Silberbauer’s name in his July 16, 1947 letter to the PRA. For more on this, see
David Barnouw and Gerrold van der Stroom: Wie verraadde Anne Frank?, Amsterdam: Boom, 2003, p. 29.
2 Nationaal Archief (NL-HaNa) [Dutch National Archives], Centraal Archief van de Bijzondere Rechtspleging (CABR) [Central
Archives for Special Criminal Jurisdiction], entry 2.09.09, inv. no. 23892: Statements J. Kleiman, January 12, 1948 and O.
4 AFS, AFC, dossier “Staatsanwaltschaft [Austrian Prosecutor’s Office]/Proces 1964”: “Bericht” (written report) submitted by
6-7.
6 NL-HaNa, CABR, 23892: copy letter Kleiman to POD, “February 1945”.
crates and bags. He thought he was dealing with a routine search and hoped it would soon be over. He repeated this version to another journalist in 1977, but added that Silberbauer was looking for weapons.

The 1958 publication of Schnabel's book Anne Frank. Spur eines Kindes (Anne Frank: A Portrait in Courage) revealed new information. Silberbauer's arrest in 1963 provided new information as well. One of the things the SD officer stated in a follow-up investigation was that he only drew his gun when he and his men entered the annex, but put it away once he saw there would be no resistance.

Otto Frank told Schnabel he was upstairs giving an English lesson to Peter van Pels – who was also in hiding – when a Dutch SD man entered Peter's room pointing a gun. Next everybody was gathered together. According to Frank, Silberbauer reacted surprised when he spotted Otto's army footlocker, realizing one of his prisoners had been a German officer during the last war (WWI). This might explain why the people in hiding were allowed time to pack up a few personal belongings. Meanwhile downstairs, Kleiman had already sent Bep Voskuijl out of the office and she had exited the building without any problem. She did not run into anybody. So by then the men sent by the SD must have been on the third floor. Jan Gies arrived for lunch, like he did every day around noon, but was immediately sent away by his wife Miep. He left the building without any difficulty too, and stated that he did not encounter any SD men. Miep indicated in 1963 that she only saw what happened in her office, so she had nothing else to add.

**Departure and Transport of the People Arrested**

After Jan Gies slipped away, he returned to his office on Marnixstraat, about a ten-minute walk. He seriously considered what he should do next. He decided to tell Kleiman's brother, who also worked in the neighborhood: for the Paauwe Co. on Bloemgracht. Standing there on the bridge across from 263 Prinsengracht, they had a good view of what unfolded next. Jan saw a dark-colored van parked out front, which apparently had not been there earlier. He thought it was the kind used by the Amsterdam police for prisoners, in any case it was not a German vehicle. In a 1963 declaration given by Silberbauer, he stated that his men transported the people arrested in a Wagen der Schutzpolizei (vehicle from the Security Police). With this, he could have meant a German or Dutch make. In December of that same year, Otto Frank referred to it as a “closed truck”. Kleiman told Schnabel that he stepped into the vehicle first, sat directly behind the driver, and exchanged a few words with him. This does not fit the description of a closed truck. Next somebody sat across from him, which would imply that the truck had lengthwise benches. It is still not clear what means of transportation was used.

Miep Gies told Schnabel that one of Silberbauer's men telephoned to arrange a van, a large model because a lot of people had been arrested. It should be pointed out here that by August 1944 almost all the telephone service to homes and businesses had been disconnected. So, the question remains if there was even a working line at 263 Prinsengracht. This does not change the fact that transportation needed to be arranged for the ten people who had been arrested. A 1974

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8 Deutsches Literaturarchiv (Marbach am Neckar) [German Literature Archive in Marbach], Collection E. Schnabel: letter V. Kugler to Schnabel, September 17, 1957; cf. Schnabel, Anne Frank, p. 107.
11 Schnabel, Anne Frank, p. 108; Silberbauer relates something similar in his August 21, 1963 statement, but then without the army footlocker or allowing those in hiding more time. See: AFS, AFC, dossier “Staatsanwaltschaft/Proces 1964” : “Bericht” (written report) K. Silberbauer, August 21 1963.
19 Schnabel, Anne Frank, p. 114.
20 “Buitengebruikstelling van telefoonaansluitingen” (Cutting Off Telephone Connections), Het Volk, June 17, 1944.
statement from Miep Gies puts the departure time of the vehicle at around one o’clock in the afternoon.\textsuperscript{21} Implying that the whole operation took around two or two and a half hours.

\textbf{Overview}

If what Jan and Miep Gies stated is accurate, the SD men were not prepared to arrest a large group and had to improvise. This contradicts statements given by Kugler and Kleiman suggesting that the SD seemed completely aware of the situation. A judicial report of the Rijksrecherche (National Department of Criminal Investigation) includes a statement from Silberbauer claiming he was told about the number of people in hiding when he received his orders. If he was in fact so well-informed, it seems strange that the raid was not better organized. Rounding up a large group of people would require more preparation, especially if there was a chance of capturing an entire network of helpers. From this standpoint, it also seems strange that the building was left unguarded. The exact number of men involved has always been unclear. It is hard to imagine that a relatively large group of SD men would not have strategically fanned out: secured the premises and surroundings. Yet Bep Voskuil simply left the office when Kleiman sent her away. And Jan Gies, who arrived for lunch, also slipped away and apparently did not notice any suspicious activity or a vehicle outside.

\textsuperscript{21} Anne Frank Stichting (AFS), Anne Frank Collectie (AFC), reg. code OFA_110: statement Miep Gies to notary A.J. Dragt, June 5, 1974.
III Was It Betrayal?

The overall picture of the arrest is based on very few known facts: an indication that unraveling the course of events leading up to the arrest is almost an impossible task. During the wartime occupation, many Dutch citizens fell into the hands of the German authorities, and frequently because of betrayal. Fear of betrayal was therefore widespread and often warranted. It is not surprising then that Otto Frank and his helpers assumed they had been betrayed. In November 1945, Otto wrote to his mother saying he had looked through police mug shots a few days before, hoping to determine who had arrested them “durch diese Leute vielleicht weiter zu hören, wer uns verraten hat” (through these people to possibly hear who betrayed us). A few days later he wrote to his second cousin Milly Stanfield: “We try to find out who betrayed us and we were confronted to the men who arrested us at the time”. Jo Kleiman also indicated, in his abovementioned letter to the PO, that he viewed betrayal as an indisputable fact. He also expressed some concrete accusations, which are addressed in more detail below.

This belief held by Otto Frank and his helpers was apparently shared by others later on. For example, when a judge of the Gerechtshof van Amsterdam (Court of Justice), J.P. Hooykaas, visited the Secret Annex on December 22, 1947. While speaking to Otto Frank and Jo Kleiman, Hooykaas took notes in his copy of the second printing of Het Achterhuis (Anne Frank: The Diary of a Young Girl), which had been published earlier that month. During this encounter, Frank and Kleiman expressed the view that betrayal had led to the arrest. It was still uncertain who might have been responsible for their betrayal, but Hooykaas noted: “Perhaps someone living in one of the rooms in a building to the right of here on Westermarkt”. It is not clear which building he meant. The notes Hooykaas took do not reveal in what capacity he visited. At the beginning of 1946, he wrote a report for the Dutch government advising judges in the administration of postwar justice to only impose the death penalty under extreme circumstances. From November 1946 to November 1948 – so at the time of his visit – he was a judge at the Court of Justice in Amsterdam. It is important to note that he was not part of the Bijzondere Gerechtshof (Special Court), which prosecuted cases involving collaboration. Hooykaas’ professional duties at that moment did not include legal action against people who had betrayed others or committed acts of treason.

A few weeks after this visit, the Politieke Recherche Afdeling or PRA (Political Investigation Branch, the successor to the POD) launched an investigation into the warehouseman Van Maaren. A causal relation is not certain, because Hooykaas did not have an official role in the Van Maaren investigation. Victor Kugler declared to the PRA: “We are convinced that betrayal played a part in this case, and we suspect a certain Van Maaren”. A closer consideration of the accusations against him follow in Section V, but Van Maaren categorically denied any involvement. Early in 1948, he wrote a statement in his defense saying he was convinced that “without inside information, the SD would have never found the secret door, no matter how hard they searched”. Implying, whether intentionally or not, that the helpers were involved.

The assumption of betrayal also found its way into the original theater adaptation of Anne Frank’s diary, which was staged for the first time in 1955. Here the betrayal was attributed to a burglar. And for those who never saw the play, this notion was widely spread through the reviews. In the late 1950s, when Schnabel started to collect material for his book Spur eines Kindes, he interviewed Otto Frank and the helpers at length. Over the years, their views had become more

22 AFS, AFC, reg. code OFA_072: letter Otto Frank to Alice Frank-Stern, November 11, 1945.
27 NI-HaNa, CABR, inv. no. 23892: statement Kugler, February 1948, p.v.b. in dossier 61169, p. 4.
30 “Het dagboek van Anne Frank” (The Diary of Anne Frank), De Tijd, November 28, 1956.
nuanced. By then, Frank thought that someone who knew something had inadvertently said too much to an outsider. Jan and Miep Gies reacted to the question if they still suspected the warehouseman by saying that the man had been brought before a judge, who had rejected the evidence as inconclusive. Kleiman simply shrugged his shoulders. 

No new information reached the public until 1963. Over the course of that year, Wiesenthal succeeded in tracking down the former SS Officer Silberbauer. At first his arrest did not receive any media coverage, but when the press got hold of the news in November, a tangled web of opinions and conjecture was woven. Additionally, when asked about Silberbauer, Otto Frank stated he had spoken to the Rijksrecherche three months earlier about him and gotten the impression it was related to an entirely different case. According to Anne’s father: “If they had wanted to hold him responsible for our arrest, they could have done it eighteen years ago”. During that investigation, both Otto Frank and Miep Gies stated that Silberbauer had said nothing in August 1944 suggesting betrayal. Otto Frank said he could not understand why somebody set on betraying them would have waited until August 4 and not informed the SD earlier. But added that he, as well as the helpers, was convinced that Van Maaren was the only possible suspect. So the investigation focused on the role of the warehouseman. As a result, his name is forever connected to the betrayal of Anne Frank.

A preliminary but cautious conclusion can be drawn here: when Schnabel started the research for his book, it had already been assumed for ten years that betrayal had led to the arrest. It is not surprising then that this belief became even more deeply rooted in 1963. An introductory chapter, “The Betrayal”, in the revised critical edition of Anne’s diary also suggests treachery as the reason behind the arrest. And while this is certainly a possibility, all the investigations and theories until now have all been based on this assumption alone. Nobody has ever seriously looked for other explanations.

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31 Schnabel, Anne Frank, p. 121.
33 “Ik ben onschuldig aan verraad familie Frank” (I'm Innocent of Betraying the Frank Family), Utrechtsch Nieuwsblad, November 22,1963.
IV The Operation

Here, it is necessary to elaborate on some important elements of the story: the infamous telephone call that supposedly set everything in motion and the men who took part in the raid. Many things said over the years, about both the call and the people involved, often took on a life on their own.

The Telephone Call

Almost always included in Anne Frank’s story is the phone call that supposedly arrived at the command post of the SD in Amsterdam on August 4, 1944. A call like this would not have been unusual. The German authorities regularly received denunciations in this way. The Amsterdam police also received tips like these. In the early evening of January 21, 1944, the police station on Stadhouderskade responded to an anonymous tip about Jews hiding in the neighborhood. Two policemen searched the building without any result.36 But this was not the end of it. Three days later, around the same time, a similar anonymous call was taken about “Jews in hiding”, and it was the exact same building. Again, the two policemen turned the building inside out. Again, with no result.37 Very few cases like this are so well-documented. It is also striking that the police took direct action without consulting any German authority. So, although anonymous calls did take place, a degree of doubt can be expressed here. In his so-called Bericht (written report), dated August 1963, Silberbauer stated that his superior Julius Dettmann received a telephone call. In his account, the caller, a Holländer (Dutchman), divulged that Jews were hiding at 263 Prinsengracht. Silberbauer then headed there with six to eight Dutch policemen. Once they arrived, they spoke to a warehouseman, whose name is not noted in the report. This worker pointed them to the office upstairs. Silberbauer ended his statement by remarking that he would have forgotten all about Anne Frank had there not been so much publicity surrounding the publication of her diary.38 This implies that new information he received had an influence on his recall. What follows below also reveals that over a brief period he told his superiors and journalists conflicting stories.

Three months later, after the case had already received extensive coverage in the press, a high-ranking Austrian official prepared a so-called Niederschrift (deposition) of an interrogation with Silberbauer. Silberbauer stated that he did not know the nationality of the person who made the phone call.39 Certainly he was an experienced investigator used to keenly observing and remembering what he saw. Yet, undeniably, almost twenty years had passed by then. Specifics in the statements that Silberbauer gave to the authorities and the press are rather different. The idea that a telephone call to the SD led to immediate action has been the cause of immense speculation. In November 1963, Silberbauer declared that Dettmann did not reveal the source of the information.40 This was normal policy. Related to another case, Inspector Abraham Kaper from Bureau Joodse Zaken or BJZ (Bureau Jewish Affairs) – which picked up Jews in hiding and interrogated them – also corroborated that information like this, and where it originated from, was not shared with subordinates.41

While examining Silberbauer’s case, an investigator from the Rijksrecherche went to interrogate none other than Willy Lages, the former German head of the Amsterdam Sicherheitsdienst who was imprisoned in Breda. Lages was also asked about the nature of the tip and the phone call. His reaction has been completely misread, resulting in a persistent misunderstanding. Lages said:

So finally, you are asking me if it is logical, after receiving a telephone call about Jews in hiding at a certain, specifically named location, one would immediately go to that building to arrest the Jews found there. I would have to respond that this is illogical. In my opinion one would first check the validity of such information, unless the tip came from someone who was

37 SAA, Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, inv. no. 2026: rapport bureau Stadhouderskade, January 24, 1944, mut. 6.30 pm.
39 AFS, AFC, dossier “Staatsanwaltschaft/Proces 1964”: “Niederschrift” (deposition), November 25, 1963.
trusted by our department. If Silberbauer’s story about receiving a tip by telephone is correct and immediate action followed that same day, my conclusion would be that the person calling in this tip was known to us and that their earlier information had also been reliable.42

This statement has been used repeatedly to argue that Lages clearly meant the caller was a known informant, who had previously provided the SD with trustworthy information.43 Yet Lages’ reasoning was only based on assumptions he was handed. He did not know if what he was being asked was true, nor did he really need to know to offer his opinion.

So, the question remains: did the SD receive a call on August 4, 1944 taken by Julius Dettmann that specifically related to Jews hiding at 263 Prinsengracht? With no available notes, logs, or other documents, this is hard to determine with certainty. Still, some brief comments are in order here. To begin with, over the course of 1944, as pointed out earlier in this report, there was hardly any private telephone service due to large-scale disconnections. A newspaper on the island of Curaçao, which was then a Dutch colony, already reported in January 1944 that this would take place in cities with more than 60,000 residents.44 Notices issued in the occupied Netherlands reported that the selection was very strict and only major factories and companies vital to the Dutch economy had a chance of being exempted.45 In Amsterdam, even a municipal service like the Luchtbeschermingsdienst (Civil Air Raid Defense) lost a large part of their lines. From the thousand exemptions requested – the number of connections in Amsterdam at that time is not known – only 277 were granted.46 This indicates that by the summer of 1944, the possibility of “giving someone a quick call” was rather restricted.

Add to this that any individual, with or without a past of being an informant, would have more likely denounced Jews in hiding to the well-known BJZ. Special police units had been set up in several Dutch cities to enforce the German occupier’s policies against the Jews. As specialists in their field, they had built up extensive networks of informants. BJZ was responsible for this in Amsterdam.47 In addition, in 1944 the telephone numbers of the SD were not listed in the phone book, contrary to those of BJZ.48 Yet, the alleged telephone call did not arrive there. If a telephone call was indeed received that morning by the SD – Silberbauer remained noncommittal in his 1964 formal declarations to the Dutch Rijksrecherche49 – then it is still possible that this call was unrelated to the orders Silberbauer received.

Melissa Müller, journalist and biographer of Anne Frank, mentions a “persistent” rumor that the phone call came from a woman.50 Of course, the only person who could verify this is the man who took that call: Julius Dettmann. But he was never questioned because he died in 1945. Barnouw and Van der Stroom point out that this story can be traced back to Cor Suijk, a confidant of Otto Frank and former director of the AFH. He supposedly heard this directly from Otto Frank.51 It is not clear

44 “Telefoonverbindingen afgesloten” (Telephone Lines Disconnected), , Amigoe di Curaçao, January 25, 1944.
45 “Afsluiting van telefoon” (No More Phone Service), De Tijd, June 19, 1944.
47 Ad van Lienpt and Jan H. Kompagnie, Jodenjacht. De onthutsende rol van de Nederlandse politie in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Amsterdam: Balans, 2011, p. 16.
51 Barnouw and Van der Stroom, Wie verraadde Anne Frank?, p. 42.
who gave Frank this information, but it was not Dettmann — the only person who could have known for sure. This story is a good example of the rumors that tend to obscure the few concrete facts.

It is important to discard all the hearsay and rumors surrounding this subject. Furthermore, it makes no sense to assume what Silberbauer claimed, based on memory, is accurate without taking into account the limiting circumstances just mentioned. If it is true, as the Viennese policeman described in his initial statement, that a Holländer (Dutchman) made the call Dettman received, this does not necessarily mean the person was an informant. Assuming the call was indeed about unusual activities on Prinsengracht, it is also possible that somebody from another so-called Dienststelle (governmental department) — German or Dutch — was on the other end of the line. In that case, there was something different going on compared to what has always been assumed. This will be examined further in Section VI. The arguments for clinging to the theory of an informant, who provided the fairly detailed information about people hiding at 263 Prinsengracht, are not convincing.
The SD Men

All the diverse aspects and details of the day of the arrest have been widely discussed, especially those related to the men who took part in the raid. There is uncertainty about the number of individuals involved and their identities, apart from the three men clearly identified. One of Silberbauer’s statements indicates that directly after the phone call, BJZ Inspector Abraham Kaper assigned six to eight men to assist him. Yet, in another statement Silberbauer says that the phone call indicated six to eight Jews.

Once again, it is very difficult to determine the accuracy of these remarks. With a group of seven to nine men, including Silberbauer himself, one would expect measures to be put in place to guard the building. It is already clear that Bep Voskuil left the premises without being detained. The same goes for Jan Gies, who also entered the building without being stopped. Except for his wife Miep, he did not encounter anybody. If there were indeed that many SD men on the premises, they must have all been upstairs in the building at that point.

Although only three names are known for certain, Kleiman wrote the following to the PRA in 1947: “The police investigator Kuiper . . . must have been present during the arrest as well, yet he was not brought before a court”.52 There are no other indications that the notorious Maarten Kuiper – executed one year later for murder and collaboration – was there the day of the arrest. Grounds for Kleiman’s opinion have also never been found. Accordingly, Kuiper has not been considered in this investigation.

Karl Joseph Silberbauer

Since Wiesenthal tracked down Silberbauer in 1963, a lot has been written about him. He was born on June 21, 1911 in Vienna, Austria. After serving for years in the city’s police force, his superiors transferred him to the Kriminalpolizei (Criminal Police) of Amsterdam in November 1943.53 As Oberscharführer he held the SS rank of squad leader. By April 1944, he was promoted in Amsterdam to the rank of Hauptscharführer: head squad leader.54

By the end of the 1950s, Wiesenthal had made it his mission to find the man who arrested Anne Frank.55 Finally, in the summer of 1963 he had Silberbauer in his sights. On July 3 of that year, the Austrian Bundesministerium für Inneres (Federal Ministry of the Interior) issued a confidential memorandum related to the “Fall der Anne Frank in Holland” (Downfall of Anne Frank in the Netherlands) in which three Silberbauers were mentioned.56 Determining the right person did not take long. In August, Silberbauer was given the opportunity to provide a written statement based on his recollections and thoughts about the arrest of Anne Frank and the others rounded up with her.57

This would be the first of several statements he gave based on memory. Not much has ever been known about Silberbauer’s activities in Amsterdam. Some information could be gleaned from different dossiers filed at the postwar CABR. Of course, all these reports date from after the liberation. During this current investigation, two additional reports mentioning his name surfaced from the archives of the Amsterdam police. These are the only known historical documents about the exact nature of his work. Precisely because statements about the raid on the Secret Annex were all given in hindsight, it is important to provide a clear picture of Silberbauer’s activities based on the sources available. To avoid interrupting the narrative of this piece, a summary of that information has been added as an appendix to this report.

It appears from this summary that the responsibilities of the Hauptscharführer did not specifically focus on hunting down people in hiding. Silberbauer himself declared in 1963 that, except for the

52 Letter printed in Barnouw and Van der Stroom, Wie verraadde Anne Frank?, p. 29.
53 Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv, Volksgesetz beim Landesgericht für Strafsachen [Municipal and Provincial Archives of Vienna: see end credit Wiener Stad], Vg (Volksgesetz) Vr (Verfahren), 288/52: document “Vg 1h Vr 432/46”, marked i53.
54 SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal police] Amsterdam, inv. no. 2036: report police station Singel, April 13-14 1944, mut. 4.30 pm.
55 Wiesenthal, Moordenaaars onder ons, pp. 214-217.
people from the Secret Annex, he was not involved in arresting Jews. This is not entirely true; other people mentioned in the appendix: Sklarek, Joost Tafelkruijer, Schaap, and those hiding in the city of Zeist were all Jews. Besides the seven people from the annex who died in concentration camps, also Sklarek and Schaap lost their lives. Of the nine cases Silberbauer was involved in, only the raid on the annex and Zeist concerned people in hiding. And this last case, according to his SD-colleague Kempin, was purely coincidental.

**Gezinus Gringhuis**

Much like the other two men known by name who were involved in the raid, the figure of Gezinus Gringhuis is also something of a mystery. Many Dutch policemen allowed themselves to do despicable things in the line of duty – some devotedly, others unwillingly, or out of fear, and some because they were simply indifferent. The activities of those who happened to arrest the girl who became world famous because of her diary have been extensively examined. Nonetheless, by combining already known and recently discovered information, this investigation delivered new insights regarding Gringhuis.

Gringhuis was born in Onstwedde, a village in the province of Groningen, in 1895. He joined the Amsterdam police force in 1918. His older brother Jinne worked there too, but was arrested in 1942 for fraud. From August 1942 until April 1943 Gringhuis was stationed with BJZ, and from July 1943 until April 1944 with the SD. In this last capacity, he mainly supervised the confiscation and storage of the household belongings of deported Jews. His next transfer is striking and worth noting here: from May 1 to November 1, 1944 he worked as *rechercheur 1e klasse der Staatsrecherche* (1st Class State Investigator) at the Bijzondere Afdeling van de Recherchecentrale (Special Unit of the Central Investigation Division) in The Hague. Implying that Gringhuis was officially not a member of the SD when the Secret Annex was raided. Yet, a policeman in the city of Nijmegen, which had already been liberated, wrote on January 18, 1945 during the initial inquiry into Gringhuis’ wartime collaboration and his involvement with the Special Unit: “In this capacity he carried out tasks for the Sicherheitspolizei (SD Secret Police).” This Special Unit, and its close ties to the SD, will be discussed in Section VI, chapter “Commitment to the Job”.

According to Gringhuis, during a postwar police interrogation he was shown reports he had compiled while working for the so-called *den Economischen Dienst* (The Economic Service), and also a report from when he was at BJZ. On August 12, 1944, a little more than a week after the raid on the Secret Annex, Gringhuis arrested Juliana Oppenheimer-Levy at her home on Overtoom in Amsterdam. She was in possession of a falsified identity card. The handful of available details do not reveal the reason for her arrest. Neither does anything indicate betrayal or other reasons, such as illegally dealing in ration coupons or forged identity papers. He turned her over to BJZ, but according to the documentation referred to above, he no longer worked there.

In any case, for the rest of the occupation, Gringhuis was employed by the Amsterdam police where he had started his career more than thirty-five years earlier. On May 1, 1945, less than a week before he was sent to prison for an extended period, he compiled a police report against an Amsterdam resident who transported some bales of grain without the required license. Until the very end, he faithfully performed his duties.

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59 SAA, Gemeentepolitie (Municipal Police) Amsterdam, inv. no. 6381: reports police station Marnixstraat, January 15, 1942, mut. 10.00 AM and January 16, 1942, mut. 6.00 am.
63 SAA, Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, inv. no. 2087: report HB. S. VI. Economische Zaken [Economic Affairs], May 1, 1945, mut. 9.00 am.
Gringhuis was identified by Otto Frank and his helpers — certainly by Kugler — as having taken part in the raid. In 1947, because of Gringhuis’ collaboration with the German occupier, he was initially condemned to death: already indicating the severity of his offenses. However, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, as well as being excluded from voting and holding elected office. Melissa Müller briefly writes that Gringhuis was “on the payroll of the SD”. As already described, he worked there for a short while, and before that was employed by BJZ. But in the spring of 1944 he joined the Special Unit of the Central Investigation Division and was therefore on the payroll of the Dutch Ministry of Justice. The day he raided 263 Prinsengracht, together with Grootendorst and Silberbauer, he did not officially work for the SD.

Willem Grootendorst

Grootendorst was born on May 4, 1889 in the city of Utrecht. He joined the Amsterdam police force in 1912. From April 1943 to mid-March of that year he worked for the SD. During that period his tasks included confiscating property and possessions and locating clandestine radios. He also arrested people, both Jews and non-Jews, who for various reasons had attracted the attention of the SD.

On or around April 10, 1944, the SD raided two locations on Prinsengracht. At one of these locations, they came across an Amsterdam policeman who was helping the people in hiding there. According to the statement this policeman later gave, he was interrogated by Grootendorst, who immediately wanted to know if he was in possession of ration coupons. Grootendorst initially wanted to hand over his former colleague to the SD, but he reconsidered after the man protested.

On June 5, 1944, Grootendorst, together with Silberbauer, raided the home of the Tafelkruijjer family on Weteringschans. As the summary of Silberbauer’s activities indicates, during this incident they were not only extremely rude to the woman of the house, but also to the family physician who was had come to look in on her. Grootendorst also accompanied Silberbauer when he arrested Eliazer Schaap on June 30, 1944. This effectively establishes that in the summer of 1944 Grootendorst was fully involved in SD activities, and he can be placed in Silberbauer’s circle of colleagues more easily than Gringhuis.

Additional Comments

In the period concerned here — early August 1944 – Jews in hiding were still fair game for the specialists of the former BJZ, who by then had been transferred to the so-called Aussenstellen, an arm of the SD. On the evening of August 1, 1944, three of them – Kuiper, Mozer and Van der Kraan – arrested Horst Weile and Ingeborg Liepmann on Jacob van Lennepkade. The police report only provides a few details, but it seems like the men caught the Jews while they were en route to a hiding place: an arrest right up their alley.

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64 Letter Otto Frank to Alice Frank-Stern, November 11, 1945, AFS, AFC, reg. code OFA_072; AFS, AFC, reg. code OFA_080: letter Kugler to Frank, February 4, 1964.
66 Müller, Anne Frank, 2013, p. 299.
67 NI-HaNa, CABR, inv. no. 68-II: Toelichting behorende bij het schema voorstellende SS en Duitsche Polizei in Nederland met de correspondeerende toporganen in Duitsland [Explanation of a schematic depicting SS and German Police in the Netherlands with the corresponding authorities in Germany], p. 23.
68 NI-HaNa, Zuivering Politie [see fn. 60], inv. no. 2271: Letter Mayor of Amsterdam to Chief of Police (Purging), Ministerie van Justitie, 12 mei 1948.
69 SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Amsterdam, inv. no. 6739: report police station Singel, April 27, 1944, mut. 6.10 pm; inv. no. 2046: report police station Houtmarkt, June 28, 1944, mut. 9.30 AM.
72 SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Amsterdam, inv. no. 2051: report police station Overtoom, August 1, 1944, mut. 9.50 am.
But then the question remains: what happened at 263 Prinsengracht? If somebody had wanted to betray the inhabitants of the Secret Annex on that August 4, 1944, they would have gotten Dettmann on the line. What was his reason for not passing this case on to the specialists? Silberbauer, Grootendorst, and Gringhuis were not considered part of that group.

In the testimony Silberbauer gave, he stated Inspector Kaper assigned some of the men under his command. Formally, Gringhuis could not have been one of them: as mentioned earlier he worked for the Special Unit at the time of the raid. So Gringhuis – different than Silberbauer and Grootendorst – was not an SD investigator at that moment. It seems unlikely, then, that he would have been assigned by Kaper. For an average case of Jews betrayed in Amsterdam in 1944, this story has many inconsistencies. All these contradictions cannot be satisfactorily explained, but they do shed a different light on old assumptions.
A Variety of Suspects

Over the years, a great deal has been written about who might have betrayed the inhabitants of the Secret Annex. Right from the start, there was a strong suspicion it was one of the warehousemen. In later years, the Austrian journalist and author Melissa Müller presented a theory related to the supposed worries of a cleaning lady. Not long afterwards, British author Carol Ann Lee proposed in her Otto Frank biography that the Dutch National Socialist A.C. “Tonny” Ahlers was involved in the betrayal. In reaction to this theory, the NIOD decided to re-evaluate the case. In their 2003 publication *Wie verraadde Anne Frank?* (Who Betrayed Anne Frank?), David Barnouw and Gerrold van der Stroom once again looked at the accusations against the warehouse worker, the female employee, and the NSB member. Their findings clearly indicate that no solid evidence against any of these individuals has ever been produced. They also briefly examined several other names associated with the case down through the years.

Despite the clear conclusions drawn by the NIOD authors, the three main suspects are re-examined in this report. More than a decade later, new data and insights have emerged that merit taking another look. A few more recent suspicions will also be addressed in this section.

**W.G. van Maaren**

Wilhelm Gerardus (Wim) van Maaren, born August 10, 1895 in Amsterdam, had various occupations during his working life: including office clerk, traveling salesman, civil servant (distributing ration coupons), and laundry dispatcher.73 Once Johan Voskuil – the father of helper Bep Voskuil – stopped working in the warehouse at 263 Prinsengracht due to a seriously illness, around March 1943 the Public Employment Office sent Van Maaren to replace him.74

The new arrival on the premises was received with mistrust, so he was at a disadvantage right from the beginning. Voskuil knew all about the people upstairs in the hiding place: in 1942 he had built the movable bookcase and from his position in the warehouse he kept a close eye on everything. Moreover, he made sure the trash was disposed of carefully and was completely trusted by everyone. It is obvious that taking Van Maaren into their confidence, because they did not know him, was too great a risk. Though this did not necessarily mean he could not be trusted. Nonetheless, Jo Kleimann told the PRA in 1948: “With the arrival of Van Maaren the safe feeling we had until then about the people in hiding gradually disappeared.”75 The deep distrust of the helpers also gradually found its way to the annex behind the bookcase. Anne Frank noted in her diary that Van Maaren was “exceptionally inquisitive” because of the air of secrecy in the building.76 Of course, she only knew of Van Maaren from hearsay, but clearly her impression of him was not very positive. She writes a few times about suspecting him of stealing, and describes him as a “seedy-looking character” and “the man with the dark past”.77 Her characterization of him is, of course, based on what she heard from the helpers.

The Opekta building was broken into during the hiding period, as was the case with many commercial buildings in the center of town.78 Besides this, many businesses suffered from theft by their own staff. This also happened at Opekta and Gies & Co, but Kleiman and Kugler were not inclined to report these cases while people were hiding in the Secret Annex. Only in January 1945, when goods were missing once again, did sales representative John Broks file a police report on...

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73 Family card and archive card W.G. van Maaren, SAA, Dienst Bevolkingsregister [Population Register], entry nos. 5422 and 30238.
74 Nl.-HaNa, CABR, 23892: “Statement-re: Gies & Co”.
75 Nl.-HaNa, CABR, 23892: p.v.b.* in dossier 61169, statement J. Kleiman, 12 January 1948.
77 *De Dagboeken*, p. 659, A-version April 21, 1944; p. 428, B-version, August 5, 1943.
78 *De Dagboeken*, p. 547-549, A-version March 1, 1944; pp. 634-642, 11 April 1, 1944; p. 414, B-version, July 16, 1943. Only the break-in reported to the police on April 11,1944 is verified by a police report: SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Amsterdam, inv. no. 2036; police station Warmoesstraat, April 9,1944, mut. 11.35 pm.
behalf of Gies & Co about the theft of seventy kilos of sugar.\textsuperscript{79} Although it appears from this report that Broks had “no suspect in mind”, the trail seemed to lead to Van Maaren. His earlier-mentioned statement, which he wrote in his defense in 1948, indicates that the police also considered him a suspect. In that same statement, he added he did not know that people were hiding in the building. But he knew that people had been in the building when he was not around.\textsuperscript{80} Because the office staff suspected him of stealing, sometimes he positioned small bottles or pencils in such a way that the next day he could tell if someone had been in the space. He emphasized, however, that he did this with Kugler’s knowledge.\textsuperscript{81}

The above sources illustrate the immense amount of distrust between Van Maaren and the helpers. It is then not surprising that the warehouseman was thought to be responsible for the arrest of the people in hiding and their two of helpers. That is the reason Otto Frank and the helpers singled him out. Otto Frank met with the PRA on June 11, 1947.\textsuperscript{82} Kleiman referred back to this meeting on July 16, when he sent the head of that agency a detailed list of the steps he and Frank had taken against Van Maaren since 1945. The Bureau Nationale Veiligheid or BNV (postwar Bureau National Security) concluded there was no evidence against Van Maaren. Except Silerbauer had never been interrogated or brought before a court in the Netherlands. Kleiman urged the PRA to re-examine Van Maaren’s case.\textsuperscript{83}

On October 16 and December 26, 1947, Frank spoke to PRA Inspector J.P. Perrels.\textsuperscript{84} More details are not known, but it is an established fact that in January 1948 the first hearings related to Van Maaren’s case were held. Barnouw and Van der Stroom rightly point to the mistakes made during this investigation. For instance, Kleiman describing what happened at the bookcase when he was not even there. While Kugler, who actually was present, was not questioned any further on this point. The NIOD authors summarize: the PRA concluded that vague hunches had not provided convincing evidence. Van Maaren objected to being placed under state supervision and stripped of his voting rights while he was under investigation. In 1949, a District Court declared the accusation unsubstantiated and dismissed the charges against him.\textsuperscript{85}

This should have put an end to Van Maaren’s judicial problems. Yet in 1963, when the word of Silerbauer’s case reached the press, this proved otherwise. The Austrian communist paper, \textit{Die Volksstimme}, released the news first. In the Netherlands, the Dutch communist newspaper \textit{De Waarheid} printed a small article on November 15. There, his name was mistakenly spelled as “Silverbauer”.\textsuperscript{86}

Simon Wiesenthal related that after he received certainty about the identity of the man he sought, he gave Silerbauer’s address to one of his staff members, Jules Huf.\textsuperscript{87} Huf, who was also a correspondent in Austria for the Dutch newspaper \textit{De Telegraaf}, looked up Silerbauer and spoke to him. On November 21, the newspaper quoted Silerbauer as saying: “I followed an indication from a Dutchman, a warehouse worker at the spice company owned by Otto Frank, Anne’s father”.\textsuperscript{88} A day later the newspaper mentioned “the warehouseman Van M.”, and added Otto Frank’s response: “We suspected him all along and reported him to the postwar authority investigating people accused of

\textsuperscript{79} SAA, Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, inv. no. 7014: Report No.16, Recherchedienst [Investigation Dept.] Amsterdam, January 16, 1945, mut. 12.30 pm.

\textsuperscript{80} Ni-HaNa, CABR, 23892: “Statement-re: Gies & Co”.

\textsuperscript{81} Ni-HaNa, CABR, 23892: p.v.b.* in dossier 61169, statement W. van Maaren, March 31,1948.

\textsuperscript{82} AFS, AFC, reg. code OFA_004: datebook Otto Frank, 1947.

\textsuperscript{83} Printed in David Barnouw and Gerrold van der Stroom, \textit{Wie verraadde Anne Frank?}, p. 29.

\textsuperscript{84} AFS, AFC, reg. code OFA_004: datebook Otto Frank, 1947.

\textsuperscript{85} Barnouw and Van der Stroom, \textit{Wie verraadde Anne Frank?}, pp. 28-31.

\textsuperscript{86} “Man die Anne Frank arresteerde nu inspecteur van politie in Wenen”(Man Who Arrested Anne Frank Now Police Inspector in Vienna, \textit{De Waarheid}, November 15,1963.

\textsuperscript{87} “De SS’er die Anne Frank arresteerde bestond echt” (The SS Officer Who Arrested Anne Frank Really Existed) \textit{Het Vrije Volk}, October 21, 1988; “Rokkostuum, witte sjaal, cilinderhoed” (Tux, White Scarf, Top Hat) \textit{De Volkskrant}, December 5, 2003. Huf said in 1967 that he got the address from Silerbauer’s mother and not Wiesenthal.

\textsuperscript{88} “LAGES noemde mij een Oostenrijkse zwakkeling” (LAGES Called Me An Austrian Weakling), \textit{De Telegraaf}, November 21,1963.
collaborating with the Nazi occupier”. 89 Frank spoke to another newspaper that same day by telephone from his home in Basel: “I never took any actions against the warehouse worker. I do not know the man and I have no evidence against him”. 90 How these two newspapers managed to get such different statements from Frank remains a mystery.

Just a day later, De Telegraaf added to the confusion by writing the following about Silberbauer’s story: “This disclosure was confirmed yesterday by Mr. Frank in Basel, who also provided the name of the warehouse worker, a certain Mr. Van M”. 91 This was not accurate: Frank did not mention the warehouse worker by name in the article or quotes. The newspaper did this. 92

In August, three months before the press got wind of the case, Silberbauer compiled a “Bericht” (written report) for his superiors about his work activities in Amsterdam. He paid particularly close attention to the arrest of Anne Frank and the others in hiding. 93 He did not say anything in that report about a warehouseman who might have betrayed them. That happened later, when journalist Jules Huf visited him.

In 1963 and 1964, Austrian and Dutch authorities investigated Silberbauer – more about him follows below – and also looked at the role of Van Maaren again. Just like fifteen years earlier, he continued to deny any involvement. The Rijksrecherche interviewed countless numbers of people, both closely and less closely involved with the case. Statements from individuals who had already been questioned about Silberbauer in 1944 were doublechecked or taken again. An investigator from the Rijksrecherche interviewed Lages about Van Maaren. Lages told him he did not know anything about the warehouse worker. 94 Otto Frank wrote in a letter to Miep Gies on December 1, 1963 that he was curious if this new investigation would deliver anything against Van Maaren, who he obviously still suspected. He was not very hopeful, given “da nichts schriftliches vorliegt” (there was no written evidence). 95 Kugler indicated, around the same time, that the discovery of Silberbauer was mainly significant because it might reveal something incriminating against Van Maaren. 96 However, Otto Frank’s doubts were warranted: all the effort exerted did not lead to any new evidence against Van Maaren.

Nevertheless, the accusations remained and were even very explicit at times. In a feature article about Kugler, an Antillean newspaper wrote in 1977: “There are strong indications against Willem Gerard van Maaren, a cigar shop owner who went bankrupt and worked in the warehouse of the Franks and later for Kugler. A lowlife who could not adjust to his subordinate position . . .”. 97

Van Maaren must have noticed that there were secretive things going on in the building; he admitted as much in his statements. That he concluded from this that people were hiding there is an assumption. And the following conclusion, that he also informed the SD, is pure speculation.

Until a ripe old age, Otto Frank corresponded with people from all over the world. He was frequently asked about the circumstances of the 1944 arrest. At the beginning of 1975, he explicitly stated, though with some grammatical errors in his Dutch: “Because there is no evidence, our former
warehouseman could not be prosecuted. Though I have heard the man has suffered for years due to the suspicions against him, because his neighbors always avoided him*. 

Despite all the suspicions, there is insufficient legal or historical evidence to prove that Van Maaren is guilty. Personal judgements about his character, which were publicized in a wide variety of ways, should not play a part here. Yet, until this day, the warehouseman often comes to mind when the arrest of Anne and the others is discussed.

**Lena Hartog-van Bladeren**

Melissa Müller suggests in her 1988 biography of Anne Frank the possibility that Lena Hartog-van Bladeren played a role in the arrests. Müller claims that Lena Hartog worked as a cleaning lady for the Cimex Company owned by the Kleiman brothers. Cimex was not actually a cleaning company, but specialized in pest control: exterminating vermin like insects, rats, and mice in ships, buildings, and household effects. Indeed, sources reveal that Lena worked as a domestic in the home of one of Cimex’s employees. It was there that she supposedly said something to his wife about Jews hiding in the Opekta building. The wife told her husband, who told Willy Kleiman, who in turn told his brother Jo Kleiman. Referring to the “persistent rumor” that the alleged August 4, 1944 phone call was made by a woman, Müller theorizes that it could have been Lena.

The wages of Lena’s husband Lammert, a worker at the Hembrug Artillery Factory, had been reduced. So, to earn some extra money, he came to work in Opekta’s warehouse after being recommended by one of Kleiman’s employees. In 1948, the PRA questioned Lena about what she had said to the wife of the Cimex employee. According to Müller, Lena “appears to have intentionally withheld the fact” that she had also worked at 263 Prinsengracht. Barnouw and Van der Stroom write that Lena denied having ever worked on Prinsengracht.

Müller’s assertion that Lena had worked in the building is essentially not convincing: Cimex did not provide any kind of cleaning services to its customers and a cleaning company called Cemsto was listed as a creditor in Opekta’s bookkeeping. Lena and Lammert Hartog told the PRA, respectively on March 18 and 20, 1948, that they had discussed the presence of Jews hiding in the building, but they were not consistent about whether this was before or after August 4. Lammert was in the building that day, so this would not have been an unusual topic of conversation after the arrest. Müller distances herself from suspicions about Lena in a revised version of her book. Yet, she still maintains that Lena worked in the building and clearly attempted to conceal this. The sources referred to in both versions of Müller’s biographies do not sufficiently support this assertion either.

**A.C. Ahlers**

Anton Christiaan “Tonny” Ahlers was born in Amsterdam on December 19, 1917. He had a troubled youth: early in 1938 he tried to drown himself in the city of Zutphen. The attempt failed and shortly afterwards he surfaced among the fanatic followers of the Dutch National Socialist E.H. ridder van Rappard. Because of their aggressive behavior, the supporters of Van Rappard frequently came to blows with the police, and Ahlers was no exception. At the end of 1938 he was involved in...
attacking Jewish personnel and customers in Amsterdam’s Bijenkorf Department Store. Early in 1939 he took part in smashing the window of the Comité voor Joodsche Vluchtelingen (Jewish Refugee Committee) on Lijnbaansgracht. For this last offense, he was jailed for a few months. In the spring of 1941, Ahlers visited Otto Frank in his office. He showed Frank a letter that had been written by someone fired by Opekta. Frank had run into this man, J.M. Jansen, on the street in March and exchanged a few words with him. According to Frank, in reaction to Jansen’s statement that the war would soon be over, he said: “The war will not be over soon and Germany will suffer terribly.”

In the letter that Ahlers had with him, Jansen appeared to be criticizing Frank’s statement. Frank wrote to the BNV in August 1945 that the letter in question was addressed to the leadership of the NSB, and it was to be forwarded to the SD. Frank thought he had been rescued from ruin and was very thankful to the bearer of the intercepted letter. Frank kept the letter and rewarded Ahlers with some money. During another visit from Ahlers he did the same, around fifteen or twenty guilders all together.

Otto Frank related that after his return from Auschwitz, he coincidentally heard the BNV had Tonny Ahlers in custody. Frank felt compelled to share his belief that Ahlers had saved his life in 1941. As already mentioned, Frank repeatedly had contact with both the BNV and the POD in 1945. The information from both these agencies painted a completely different picture of Ahlers. Frank wrote to the BNV in August about “Ahlers”, but by the end of November he was spelling his name as “Alers”. Although this seems like an insignificant point, the exchanges he had with these agencies could explain it. An illegal Signalementen-blad (Description Booklet) distributed in 1944, warning of betrayers and provocateurs, includes among the dozens of dangerous individuals also an “Alers, Amstelveen”. That this referred to Tonny Ahlers is certain, and apparently the BNV also used this booklet to convince Frank there was another side to his “rescuer”. In her biography about Otto Frank, Carol Ann Lee formulates a rather complicated theory based on this information, including that Ahlers tried to use the letter to force Frank to do business with him. Supposedly, Ahlers was also aware of the arrangements Frank had made to protect Gies & Co. from Aryanization. While Lee rightfully distrusts statements given by Ahlers later on, it is surprising that she believes him here. Her theory is also based on the claim that Otto Frank’s Pectacon company did business with the German Military. Her most important source is documentation she mistakes as a Pectacon order book, while it actually belonged to an Amsterdam spice broker. Pectacon appears there as a client because it was too small a company to operate on the spice commodity market by itself. Pectacon was not involved in the June 5, 1940 transactions that Lee mistakenly saw as evidence. Not much remains of the web of intrigue Lee wove around Ahlers, Frank, their business dealings and the German Wehrmacht.

111 SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Amsterdam, inv. no. 7013: report police station Warmoesstraat, April 6, 1943, mut. 3.15 pm.
113 NIIHaNa, CABR, 23834: O.H. Frank, November 20, 1946.
114 AFS, AFC, reg. code OFA_084: O. Frank to Bureau Nationale Veiligheid [postwar Bureau National Security or BNV], August 1945.
115 AFS, AFC, reg. code OFA_084: O. Frank, August 21,1945.
116 Barnouw and Van der Stroom, *Wie verraadde Anne Frank*, p. 52
117 NIOD: *Het Signalementenblad* (Description Booklet), August 1944.
120 AFS, AFC, B_Getuigen_I_193: transcript of an interview with W.F. van Tellingen by Dineke Stam, September 14, 1994 and a handwritten, undated explanation by Van Tellingen.
Despite all the connections and conjecture there is no proof that anything more was going on between Ahlers and Frank prior to the hiding period than their meetings in 1941. Lastly, Lee’s assertion that Ahlers knew in 1944 that people were hiding in the building has been dismissed by Barnouw and Van der Stroom as a misinterpretation of a Rijksrecherche report. With this, the theory that Ahlers told Maarten Kuiper, who subsequently passed this tip on to the SD, is also refuted. The allegations that Ahlers blackmailed Frank after the war, as interesting as this might seem, are not of further importance here.

**Joseph Jansen and His Son**

Closely related to the suspicions against Ahlers are the 1941 actions taken by J.M. ("Job") Jansen. Born in 1887, he was the husband of Jetje Jansen-Bremer. She promoted and explained how to use Opekta products in 1935 and 1936. Around the same time, Jansen occasionally lent a hand setting up and breaking down Opekta stands at fairs and trade shows. Jansen’s political views in that period leaned toward the NSB, but Otto Frank felt he could be trusted because he was married to the Jetje, who was Jewish. During the occupation, Jansen joined the Weerbaarheidsafdeling or WA (paramilitary arm of the NSB) and in this capacity threatened Amsterdam policemen during the funeral of WA member Hendrik Koot. In March 1941, Jansen and Frank ran into each other on Rokin and struck up a conversation. A few weeks later, as described earlier, Tonny Ahlers appeared on Otto’s doorstep.

Shortly after returning to Amsterdam from Auschwitz, Otto Frank took steps against Jansen. On August 21, 1945, he wrote to the POD: “I do not know if the Mr. Jansen mentioned in this letter has already been caught, but I am certain that this man has dirty hands”. Jansen’s file shows that during the occupation he tried to get a job with the authorities, and he wanted to be eligible for a NSB training course to become a mayor. In 1949 he was brought before the Amsterdam District Court accused of six punishable offenses, including the 1941 denunciation of Otto Frank. Jansen was judged guilty on all counts. Frank’s postwar initiative against Jansen was therefore not related to the raid on the Secret Annex. Apparently, he rightly saw that these two incidents were not connected. Yet, Barnouw and Van der Stroom note that in 1964 Ahlers wrote that Otto Frank was convinced “his employees Jansen” – plural meaning both father and son – had betrayed him. In a 1966 letter, Ahlers added that Frank knew “the most likely warehouse worker/betrayer was Jansen Jr.” Barnouw and Van der Stroom rightfully point out that Ahlers did not substantiate his allegations in any way.

And the discrepancies do not end there. While not much is known about Jansen working for Opekta, in a statement Otto Frank gave in 1946 he said that Jansen’s wife worked for him in 1935 and 1936. Jetje Jansen gave her last Opekta demonstration – as far as is traceable – in the summer of 1936. That following year the company hardly organized promotional activities like these. Husband Job Jansen occasionally helped by setting up stands, but after the autumn of 1935 there is absolutely no information indicating that Opekta took part in any fairs or trade shows.

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122 Barnouw and Van der Stroom, *Wie verraadde Anne Frank?*, p. 75.
124 Private property Jansen family: letter Otto Frank to Bestuur Dameskroniek [Board of the Ladies Chronicle, a weekly magazine], October 6, 1934.
127 Ni-HaNa, CABR, 23834: letter O. Frank to POD, August 21, 1945.
129 Barnouw and Van der Stroom, *Wie verraadde Anne Frank?*, pp. 46 and 84.
130 Ni-HaNa, CABR, 23834: dossier 8082, statement Frank, November 20, 1946.
131 “Provinciaal nieuws” ( Provincial News), *Nieuwsblad van het Noorden*, July 18, 1936.
Jansen’s son, like his father, also occasionally did odd jobs for Opekta. Nevertheless, there are no other sources that show a relationship between the Jansen family and Opekta after the summer of 1936. At that time, Opekta was still located at 400 Singel. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that any member of the Jansen family was familiar with the building at 263 Prinsengracht, which Opekta only started using in November 1940. Neither is there a reason to think any of them knew about the people hiding in the Secret Annex.

Nelly Voskuijl

Barnouw’s Het fenomeen Anne Frank (The Anne Frank Phenomenon) was released in 2012. In this book, the author suggests that perhaps the younger sister of Bep Voskuijl, Nelly (1923-2001) needs to be included among the suspects. He adds that although she has no criminal case file, she still worked on a German air base in the north of France until May 1944. This fact is only known because Anne Frank noted it in her diary on May 11, 1944. A biography about Bep, the youngest office clerk who faithfully helped the people hiding, was released in 2015. Her son and a Belgium journalist cooperated on this book. Here, the authors once again connect Bep’s sister Nelly to the betrayal of the Secret Annex, but the tone is less adamant. Their argument begins with the Amsterdam police arresting the underage Nelly on Nieuwendijk, while she was out on the town with a German officer. Nelly is then brought to the police station on Warmoesstraat. Other people picked up that same evening, both earlier and later, were accused of violating curfew. For unknown reasons, no grounds for Nelly’s arrest were noted in her police report. Because she was a minor, her father came to fetch her.

The authors continue with the premise that Nelly’s father prohibited her from seeing the German any longer. Shortly thereafter, she allegedly received – “via German connections” – a free German visa within three days. Allowing her, according to this story, to secretly leave her parents’ home and travel to Germany with her lover, where she would immerse herself in National Socialism. The document used to corroborate this assertion is an application for a Dutch passport: requested in December 1942 from the municipality of Amsterdam according to normal procedure. The application includes the annotation “A.B.,” indicating that the head of the city’s Employment Office approved issuing the document free of charge, given it was meant for work in Germany. Practically all the passports requested this way were prepared within a few days and free of charge. The application further mentions “with consent”, which was unavoidable for minors: a passport could only be issued with the permission of her parents.

Nelly did not run away from home with the help of her German connections, but left with a passport acquired through regular channels. Family tensions, possibly because of her relationship with a German soldier, can of course not be excluded. Still it is important to realize that at the end of 1942 many of Amsterdam’s residents requested passports in this way because they wanted to go work in Germany.

Anne Frank clearly noted in her diary that Nelly worked on a German air base in the north of France. Nelly returned to Amsterdam in 1944. The authors of Bep Voskuijl, het zwijgen voorbij (Bep Voskuijl, Silence No More) place a great deal of emphasis on the political choices Nelly made. In their description of Silberbauer’s case, they hark back to a version of the bewildering story that a young woman made the call. They suggest that Silberbauer deliberately told the world press that Van Maaren was the betrayer, while he told his Austrian superiors, as well as the Dutch authorities, that he did not know. In addition, Silberbauer supposedly only revealed the truth to Cor Suijk: namely

135 Anne Frank, Verzameld werk, published under the auspices of the Anne Frank Fonds Basel, Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2013, pp. 598-599.
136 Jeroen de Bruyn and Joop van Wijk, Bep Voskuijl, 2015.
137 SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Amsterdam, inv. no. 7009: report police station Warmoesstraat, November 1, 1941, mut. 12.50 pm (report runs from 5.30 am. to 5.30 a.m the next day) and November 2, 1941, mut. 10.00 am.
138 De Bruyn and Van Wijk, Bep Voskuijl, pp. 84-86.
139 SAA, Secretarie, afdeling Algemene Zaken [Secretariat: Municipal Department of General Affairs] inv. no. 7481: passport request H.P. Voskuijl, December 18, 1942, printed on page 85 of the handleiding (booklet).
that it was a young woman. Allegedly, Silberbauer publicly accused Van Maaren because he wanted to protect that woman, “possibly because of shared Nazi sympathies – or because she knew too much about Silberbauer’s past . . .” \[141\] The next step in the theory is that after Silberbauer’s disclosure about the possible role of a young woman, Otto Frank lost interest in Van Maaren and no longer mentioned him as a suspect. \[142\] Implying that Frank then realized who it had been, and out of consideration for Bep wanted to keep this quiet. Finally, the rightful conclusion of the authors is that painting a picture of Nelly as the betrayer “is a bridge too far”. \[143\]

\[141\] De Bruyn and Van Wijk, *Bep Voskuijl*, pp. 159-160.
\[143\] De Bruyn and Van Wijk, *Bep Voskuijl*, pp. 198-199.
VI Other Sources and Scenarios

People in the Surrounding Area
The Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie or RIOD (later the NIOD) received a phone tip in 1981 that during the occupation a NSB member living on Westermarkt had supposedly asked around in the neighborhood about what was going on in the Opekta building. The man in question died in 1943, which of course undermines this implied accusation. Also if someone else was aware of the situation and passed on that information anyway, it is still strange that first so much time passed. As described in Section III, the likelihood of a neighbor being the source of the fatal tip was already mentioned in 1947, when Judge Hooykaas visited the Secret Annex. Whether this was a reference to the same person remains unclear; according to Hooykaas it was about a “boarder” on Westermarkt. In this context, a website called the “Anne Frank Diary Reference” mentions the real estate agent Siet Aandewiel, who lived at 6 Westermarkt. He passed away in March 1943. In the meantime, the site has added a posting – from nameless researchers – that there is no proof that Aandewiel was a “Nazi-sympathizer” or connected to Anne’s life in any way. It is not clear then why this website even mentions Aandewiel, although he did have ties to NSB circles. The caller who informed the RIOD requested to remain anonymous at the time. The whole story sounds strangely familiar to the 1944 telephone tip: it is not clear who called and what the significance of the message was, but it led to much speculation.

While Barnouw and Van der Stroom were working on their publication Wie verrade Anne Frank? they visited the Secret Annex. From the attic window, they saw “a sea of windows” and they realized all those windows also had a clear view of the building they were in. Barnouw logically concluded that there were many ways information about movement in the Secret Annex could have been passed via the neighbors, whether deliberately or not. On the other hand, in those days the corner of Prinsengracht and Westermarkt was a disorderly jumble of buildings with front and back parts and makeshift structures added on. People lived there or a variety of business activities took place in the spaces. Detailed information cards saved from Amsterdam’s Population Register indicate that people frequently relocated. Therefore, it was not unusual to notice a change in a building’s occupancy or function. That simple carelessness could have played a role in the arrest cannot be excluded either. Anne notes in her diary that when it gets dark she peeks into the lighted rooms of the neighbors out back. She wrote this in the part of her diary she revised at the beginning of 1944, in which she allowed herself literary freedom. And that is also the case here: if the neighbors’ lights were on without the curtains being drawn, given the wartime blackout ordinances, the police and air defense would have been on their doorstep in no time. At the beginning of 1941, so before the hiding period began, the police forced open the Opekta building’s front door to switch off a light left burning in the hallway. The incident was probably not forgotten when the plans for going into hiding were taking shape. This decreases the chance that the inhabitants of the Secret Annex were neglectful about using the blackout curtains, something people in the surrounding area certainly would have noticed. The idea of an anonymous neighbor is of course plausible. There is, however, no concrete evidence to support this theory.

144 Paape, “Het verraad”, p. 53 and 56, fn. 81.
146 NIOD, Boekhandel en Sigaren Bedrijf de Driehoek [see NIOD archive list: end of report], inv. no. 14: verzendlijsten Driehoek Nieuws [mailing list local newspaper]; Ledenlijst van de Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Amsterdam, uitgegeven door de Politieke Opsporingsdienst [see Bibliography], 1945.
147 David Barnouw, Het fenomeen Anne Frank, p. 30.
150 SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Amsterdam, inv. no. 6439: report police station Marnixstraat, March 4, 1941, mut. 10.00 pm.
**Ans van Dijk and Her Entourage**

An investigation into the history of the hiding place at 263 Prinsengracht reveals intricate networks of individuals. These connections largely went unnoticed prior to this new investigation, but due to using a broader approach they are now visible. One of the patterns that emerged offers surprising insights, although the exact significance is yet to be determined. There is an indirect connection to involvement by the notorious wartime betrayer Ans van Dijk,151 a scenario suggested by Dutch journalist and author Sytze van der Zee. The extent to which that might have played a role is explained below. In this network of social and business connections the focus is not on Otto Frank or the Secret Annex, but on Jo Kleiman’s brother Willy.

In 1933, Willy Kleiman married a German woman who had come to the Netherlands to work as a housekeeper. Her sister, who was also a housekeeper, married Bernard Roozendaal. At the end of the 1930s, the brother-in-laws each had a brother working in the food branch: Jo Kleiman and Siegfried J. Roozendaal.152 Kleiman was involved in setting up the firm Pectacon and Roozendaal owned a small canning factory called Tokita on Weteringstraat. In 1938 the two companies were interested in having a stronger business relationship.153 Not only did Siegfried Roozendaal have contact with Pectacon through Tokita, but he also lived in the same neighborhood as Otto Frank and his family.154 Shortly after they went into hiding, Anne Frank wrote in her diary several times about Roozendaal and his company.155 These kinds of connections tie the world of the Frank family to that of the Roozendaal brothers – even if it is unclear how close that relationship was.

Bernard Roozendaal had a daughter Greta (born 1914) from an earlier marriage. His second marriage to a non-Jewish woman protected him, but his daughter faced the threat of deportation. When the situation became too dangerous, her uncle Willy Kleiman and his brother Jo arranged a hiding place for her in the Zaanstreek, an area north of Amsterdam. Bernard’s brother Siegfried also had a daughter, Rosalie (1924). After her parents got divorced, she lived with her mother in the town of Hilversum. Despite their age difference, the girls had a close relationship.156 Rosalie also had to go into hiding, but was picked up in Amsterdam in August 1943.157 Presented with a difficult choice by the police, she went to work for the SD and for a few months became part of Ans van Dijk’s entourage.158 In January 1944, she managed to escape from the clutches of the SD and went into hiding near the city of Nijmegen.159

Considering these facts, three questions need to be asked:
1. Did Rosalie know that the Kleiman brothers had helped her cousin Greta go into hiding?
2. If so, did she reveal this to Ans van Dijk or another member of her circle?
3. And in that case, did Ans van Dijk act on this information?

It is not clear whether Rosalie knew that her cousin had gone into hiding, and there is no longer a way to find out. Given how close the two girls were, it certainly seems possible. In that case, Rosalie would have obviously known that the Kleiman brothers helped Greta find a hiding place. If Rosalie was aware of all this, given Ans van Dijk’s talent for forcing information out of people in her surroundings, it certainly seems plausible that Rosalie gave this away. And if Van Dijk subsequently knew that the Kleiman brothers extended a helping hand to people who needed to go into hiding,

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151 Van der Zee, Vogelvrij, pp. 445-455.
153 Private property Hofhuis family: explanation about Tokita from Van der Graaff & Co. Sneldienst (Trade Information), October 5, 1938.
154 SAA, Bevolkingsregister, entry no. 30238: archive card S.J. Roozendaal.
158 Groen, Als slachtoffers daders worden, pp. 100-103.
there was still not a definitive connection to 263 Prinsengracht. Van Dijk would have had to follow-up on this information.

Even if the first two questions above could be answered unequivocally with yes, the last question is still an extremely difficult one. Would Ans van Dijk have immediately passed this kind of information on, or was she inclined to hold on to something for later? According to Sytze van der Zee, it was not unusual for an investigator who had information that was somewhat vague to wait for a while, to go back to it when there was nothing much to do. In this case, more than six months would have passed. As in the earlier-mentioned case of the person living on Westermarkt, waiting so long seemed unlikely.

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The make-up of the network described above is based on facts. It is of course striking how closely connected Ans van Dijk’s entourage was to the Secret Annex. Yet it is totally unclear how these people who were indirectly connected to each other actually behaved. Given the many questions, and the length of time, it is very doubtful that any information was passed on in this way. All the people involved are also deceased, so it is practically impossible to obtain additional information.

Commitment to the Job
Since this investigative study is based on one certainty – the raid itself – more attention needs to be paid to the possibility that a completely different cause was behind this raid. Besides this fundamental reasoning – given it is only an assumption that an unknown person committed betrayal – relevant information has also emerged that supports this logic. This chapter delves deeper into the matter.

In March 1944, for a few consecutive days, Anne Frank wrote in her diary about the arrest of two men involved in the illegal trade of ration coupons. She calls them “B” and “D”, referring to two salesmen, Brouwer and Daatzelaar, who represented Gies & Co. This firm, affiliated with Opekta and located in the same building on Prinsengracht, traded in spices and other ingredients for the food industry. According to Anne, the arrests had an immediate impact on the food supply of the people in hiding. Anne’s notations are confirmed by police reports from the cities of Zwolle and Haarlem. She returned to this matter a few more times, and the reports indicate she was well-informed. After about two weeks in custody, the Gies & Co. salesmen were released – at four o’clock in the afternoon – and the next day Anne noted this in her diary. This illustrates how closely the people in hiding followed these developments.

The case ran into complications when the Zwolle police, following protocol, brought the matter to the attention of the Recherchecentrale (Special Unit of the Central Investigation Division) in The Hague. The arrest report of the two salesmen arrived on the desk of investigator Dirk van Donk. In an undated statement, though one he made right after the war, Van Donk wrote about his work with some bitterness: “I registered reports that were sent by different police departments in the Netherlands directly to the division we have been talking about. I was not the one who delivered reports to the so-called German Department. This was always initiated by my truly Dutch colleagues, who nowadays think so highly of themselves”. Consults with Van Donk about processing arrested offenders are also mentioned in Amsterdam police records.

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160 Van der Zee, Vogelvrij, p. 451.
161 De Dagboeken, p. 567, 570, and 572, A-version, March 10, 12, and 14, 1944.
162 Historich Centrum Overtijssel (HC) [Overtijssle Historical Society], Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Zwolle, inv. no. 25: Dag- en nachtrappen van de afdeling Bijzondere Wetten en Economische Dienst [Lit. Day and night reports of the Special Regulations and Economic Service], March 7, 1944, mut. 9.30 am and 10 March 10, 1944, mut. 8.30 pm; Noord-Hollands Archief (N-RA), Gemeentepolitie Haarlem, inv. no. 1666, reports related to violations of the Distributiewet [Distribution of food and goods law], pp. 316-317.
164 HCO, Gemeentepolitie Twolde, inv. no. 25: March 9, 1944, mut. 10.00 am.
165 Nl-HaNa, CABR, inv. no. 34590: undated written statement Dirk van Donk, p. 10.
166 SAA, Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, inv. no. 2036: report Economische Zaken bureau [Economic Affairs Bureau] Kattenburg, April 8, 1944, mut. 13.20 pm.
Over the course of 1941, the authorities wanted to more effectively combat the many cases of fraud related to distribution and slaughtering. At the Recherchecentrale in The Hague, different investigative branches were brought together on a national level. A so-called Gruppe V or “Special Unit” was set up at the Recherchecentrale. It was put in charge of tracking down those who violated distribution and slaughter ordinances. Local police forces were obliged to immediately report all offenses related to these laws to this unit. When the chief of a local police station thought that information was “more significant than usual” he was expected to communicate this by telephone. The head of the Special Unit then decided if the case would be handled further by a German or a Dutch authority. Cases that seemed related to the Dutch resistance went to the Germans; more mundane cases like economic violations were left to the Dutch. Though the Dutch police investigators who were posted to the Central did not officially work for the Germans, they were essentially supervised by the SD. Many – but certainly not all of them – felt conflicted about this state of affairs. After September 1944, this Special Unit was no longer under German supervision and became a more integrated part of the Recherchecentrale. In statements given after the war, the Special Unit’s Dutch investigators emphasized that they referred as many cases as possible to the Dutch authorities, because then the punishments were less harsh. While not all that much is known about the unit itself, some of the cases it handled are very well documented. Particularly the robbery of the distributie-kantoor (rationing office) in the town of Joure was very high-profile, and several of the investigators assigned to the case exerted a major effort. During this investigation, some Jews in hiding were discovered by chance and arrested. The Special Unit also stumbled upon people in hiding on other occasions. Late one May night in 1943, an investigator named Veenstra with a colleague and a local policeman raided a clandestine butcher in the village of Gootschmer. In the confusion, two women in nightgowns tried escaping but failed. Efforts by Veenstra’s colleagues to persuade him to let the women go, given they were irrelevant to the case, were unsuccessful. Both women, two sisters, one of whom had been a business partner of Ans van Dijk in better days – who like the Frank family had also lived on Merwedeplein before going into hiding – were gassed a short time later in the Sobibor extermination camp.

The Zwolle ration-coupon case, mentioned by Anne in her diary, was forwarded to the Dutch judicial authorities. Salesman Brouwer appeared in front of the judge in Zwolle in August 1944 for his economic offenses, and the local press covered the case. It became evident during the court sitting that Brouwer had contact with an extensive network of butchers in and around Zwolle – not unusual for a sales representative in his branch. He also had contacts in Haarlem, where Daatztelaar lived, and in The Hague and Rotterdam. Brouwer was fined the considerable sum of eight-hundred guilders, meant to recover the profit he had acquired illegally. On failing to pay he would be sentenced to eighty days in jail. Besides this, he was sentenced to one month imprisonment. He could, however, appeal his sentence based on a pardon clause, a new legal provision introduced by Reichskommissar Seyss-Inquart when he was the governor of the occupied Netherlands.

167 Ni-HaNa, Militair Gezag [see archive list: end of report], inv. no. 1528, copy circular November 1, 1941 from the Departement van Justitie [Dutch Ministry of Justice].
168 Ni-HaNa, CABR, 68-II: Toelichting behoorende bij het schema voorstellende SS en Duitsche Polizei in Nederland met de corresponderende toporganen in Duitschland [see fn. 67], p. 23.
170 Ni-HaNa, CABR, 68 I-II: resumé [summary] case Marten Veenstra.
171 Groen, Als slachtoffers daders worden, p. 91; SAA, Dienst Bevolkingsregister [Population Register], entry 30238: archive cards E. Harschel and M.J. Harschel.
172 “Een Zwolsche suiker- en een dito vleeschaffaire” (Sugar and Meat Fraude in Zwolle), Provinciale Zwolsche en Overijsselsche Courant, August 17, 1944.
Daatzelaar was prosecuted in Haarlem. His court case was scheduled for July 26, 1944, but for unknown reasons it was indefinitely postponed during that session. The public prosecutor noted the dismissal in the register that same day.

Available sources do not reveal why this happened. There is also nothing known about the statements Daatzelaar made during his preliminary hearing or if his NSB sympathies might have played a role. Anne Frank mentioned him in her diary as one of the people they needed to be quiet for in the Secret Annex, so according to her he was not aware of people hiding upstairs in the building.

It is very possible that the Special Unit – where of course the connection between the two men could not have gone unnoticed – started digging deeper. The investigators working there had a lot of experience and were conscientious about their work. It is difficult to say if their investigations in August 1944 were being conducted with as much a commitment as earlier in the occupation; it was already a few weeks after D-Day. At any rate, in July another significant case came to light in Haarlem, and given the size and the character of that case the Special Unit was most likely involved. Unfortunately, hardly any archival material about the activities of the Special Unit has been preserved. And while a causal relation cannot be proven, it is striking, to say the least, that Gringhuis – who was present for the raid – at that moment worked for the department supervising Anne’s “coupon men”, who were in custody awaiting trial.

Daatzelaar was interned, shortly after the liberation, for being a member of the NSB from June 1940 to December 1943. Kugler felt compelled to help his salesman. In September 1945, he wrote to the POD in Haarlem saying that Daatzelaar had made an effort to get him and Kleiman out of jail after they were arrested. In that letter, Kugler fleetingly mentions something remarkable: “... Opekta’s management was arrested by the SD in 1944 for hiding Jews, and giving clandestine work to people to keep them from being sent to Germany ...” Opekta’s management was arrested by the SD in 1944 for hiding Jews, and giving clandestine work to people to keep them from being sent to Germany. Though Lammert Hartog’s presence in Opekta’s warehouse was against the rules, it is not clear if Kleiman’s arrest was directly related to Hartog working on the premises. It is also not clear if Hartog was found by chance or because of a targeted action.

These circumstances alone raise questions. Kugler’s statements about a routine search of the building and clandestine work bear consideration. Lammert Hartog working off the books “ter ontduikking aan de arbeidsinzet” (to avoid being sent to Germany as forced labor) was already established during the 1948 PRA investigation. Based on this fact, Kugler’s statements are significant in yet another way. Over the course of 1944, the German SS-Führer Hans Rauter made efforts to implement a new coupon distribution system. His aim was to exclude the sizeable number of people in hiding from receiving this kind of food assistance, particularly those trying to escape forced labor in Germany. There is proof that within the confines of 263 Prinsengracht, wheeling and dealing with ration coupons was going on – the salesmen of a company active in the food branch were committing fraud. Besides this, illegally employing those who had been called up to work in Germany, as Kugler formulated in his statement using the plural tense, clearly damaged German economic interests.

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174 Noord-Hollands Archief (NHA), Arrendissementsrechtbank Haarlem 1940-'49, inv. no. 155: Trial Register, rolno. 1453E.
176 “Grote zwendel met vlees en kaas” (Huge Swindle with Meat and Cheese), Het Volk, July 14, 1944.
177 NI-HaNa, CABR, inv. no. 105746: formal request from Daatzelaar, to be released from custody while awaiting his court hearings, March 27, 1946.
179 NIOD Instituut voor Oorlogs-, Holocaust- en Genocidestudies (NIOD), Amsterdam, Archive Anne Frank 212c-6e: copy registratiekaart Amersfoort; NRK, dossier 97791: Registratiekaart Polizeiliches Durchgangslager Amersfoort [Lit. Registration card, Police Transit Camp Amersfoort].
VII Conclusions

The question asked here: Based on what information did the SD raid 263 Prinsengracht on August 4, 1944, and how did it obtain that information? remains difficult to answer with the data available. While also this investigation has not conclusively established what happened leading up to the much-discussed and fatal raid, the newly discovered information and this broader analysis contribute to a better understanding of the matter in question. This report closely examined a few long-standing assumptions.

Otto Frank, the only survivor of the people in hiding, was always convinced that they had been betrayed. The helpers were equally convinced. As understandable as this is, focusing on betrayal alone limits one’s field of vision and overshadows other scenarios. It also emerged that “the phone call”, accepted for years as fact, was not such a self-evident occurrence. Of course, the information presented here does not refute the notion that an unknown person with treacherous motives could have called. However, it is also important to consider other possibilities.

New insights concerning earlier suspicions have been brought together here. The suspicions against Van Maaren and Lena Hartog were based on the perception that neither of them could be trusted. Where concrete evidence was lacking, suspicions like these were apparently convincing enough. This was not needed with Ahlers. His record was not very good to begin with and he was guilty of all sorts of political crimes. Still, Carol Anne Lee’s elaborate construct about his involvement with the Secret Annex does not stand up to scrutiny; the evidence does not adequately support her theory. Ahler’s himself again illustrated his unstable, untrustworthy character with his accusations in the 1960s against Job Jansen and his son. A striking detail here is that Job Jansen was actually convicted for denouncing Otto Frank. This was, of course, related to the 1941 letter he wrote about Frank’s doubts about Germany winning the war. There are no other sources revealing any further contact between the Jansen family and Otto Frank or Opekta after the summer of 1936. Even if these two men conspired against Otto, with Ahlers acting as the middleman, there is no reason to believe that together they would have had enough information to betray the people in hiding. Accepting the assumption of betrayal as a given is still the weakest element of all these theories. Indeed, where there is betrayal, there must be a betrayer. This has resulted in a hunt that has provided a variety of names, but no concrete evidence.

Going into hiding during the occupation and fraud with ration coupons went hand in hand. It is obvious that while searching for people in hiding the SD might have discovered a clandestine trade in ration coupons or other illegal activities. It is just as obvious that during an investigation into fraud with coupons or something similar that people in hiding could be found by chance. A few examples of such a scenario are given this report. Going into hiding and fraud with coupons were inextricably linked, as were the investigations into these activities.

The cases now known with SS Officer Silberbauer’s involvement mainly reveal activities not related to hunting down people in hiding. SD man Grootendorst was at Silberbauer’s side more than once in 1944, but now it appears that Gringhuis was part of the Special Unit that investigated economic crimes. This, in fact, places the matter in an entirely different light.

Kugler described something to Schnabel that initially seemed like a routine house search. Furthermore, he suggested that protecting workers from being deported as forced labor was also grounds for arrest. Besides this, the firm of Gies & Co inadvertently attracted the attention of the Special Unit, which had close ties to the SD, due to the arrest of the “coupon men”. Anne’s diary entries indicate that the people in hiding depended on ration coupons obtained from the salesmen who worked for Gies & Co. Taking everything into account, it is obvious that these coupons were not delivered directly to them, but given to the helpers.

There are no primary sources specifically indicating that the SD raided the building because of economic violations, such as illegally dealing in ration coupons or other goods, or even protecting people from being sent to Germany as forced labor. A more detailed examination of the business
activities of the companies located at 263 Prinsengracht, particularly during the hiding period, might provide new insights. Holding on to the idea that betrayal, and consequently a guilty party, played a role in the arrest, has never delivered anything conclusive. If the primary question asked continues to be “who?”, it is unlikely that much more will be discovered. The alternative is to establish “sufficient facts and circumstances” about the entire course of events surrounding the hiding period in the building, so a clearer picture of its many facets emerges. The more concrete clues, the more opportunities to narrow the search for answers. In this way, the mystery might one day be solved.
Appendix I — Summary of Cases in the Netherlands with Silberbauer’s Involvement

A broad look at source material related to Silberbauer provides the following overview.

— March 1944: Silberbauer handles a case related to securities.

In an ex-Amsterdam policeman’s backyard, a metal cashbox containing securities was unearthed by among others Silberbauer and the SD man Pieter Schaap. As fate would have it, two boxes were buried in that garden: the ex-policeman had saved some things from a Jewish couple and a non-Jewish couple. While trying to locate the Jewish couple’s property the SD somehow ended up by the former policeman, but they found the non-Jewish couple’s box. Because the SD did not know that a second was buried there, they assumed it was the box they were looking for. The SD arrested the ex-policeman and the owner of the box.  

— April 13, 1944: In the center of Amsterdam, Silberbauer arrests H.W. Polder and W. Woelders, 17 and 19 years old, both non-Jews.

According to one of Polder’s sons, his father—who worked in a fur workshop—later told him that he had arranged to warn his Jewish boss, who he did not refer to by name, in the event of impending danger. The day the SD actually arrived—it is not known why, but the fur industry was so-called Kriegswichtig (vital for the war effort)—his boss managed to get away, but Polder was arrested. A message he sent to his family indicates that Polder was remanded in custody for a short time in the German section of the Huis van Bewaring, a jail on Havenstraat. The involvement of the other young man arrested, Woelders, is still not clear. If Polder’s Jewish boss was indeed still present at his workshop, he may have been in a “mixed” marriage (meaning he was married to a non-Jewish woman) or had a so-called Sperre (document exempting him from deportation).

— June 5, 1944: Silberbauer arrests E.A. Tafelkruijer-Olofssen, C.E.S. Husfeldt, and J. Tafelkruijer, the first two non-Jews.

Erna Tafelkruijer-Olofssen was not Jewish, but was married to the Jewish Wolf Tafelkruijer. Because of being married to her, he was not in direct danger. Yet, he still kept a low profile. A day earlier, on June 4, the Amsterdam police detained his Jewish nephew on suspicion of fraud. The young man was released the same day, which suggests it was not a very serious matter. Secondly it means that he was also protected from deportation. It can hardly be a coincidence that the next day Silberbauer and Grootendorst raided his uncle’s home, and arrested his wife and a boarder living there. They found a significant amount of money on them. The third person arrested was the eighteen-month-old son of the nephew who had been questioned the day before. As a precaution the child was placed with the aunt and uncle of his father. The toddler ended up in the Westerbork transit camp, but was sent home after a lawyer intervened. By coincidence, during the raid, Erna Tafelkruijer-Olofssen’s family physician arrived on the doorstep to make a house call. It just so happens that this doctor, who Grootendorst and Silberbauer

182 SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Amsterdam, inv. no. 2038: report Police Station Singel, April 13-14, 1944, mut. 4.30 pm.
183 E-mail from Hans Polder to Gertjan Broek (AFS), July 23, 2015.
184 Private property of Hans Polder: notice of remand from Huis van Bewaring II in envelop marked “AMSTERDAM, Havenstraat 6. (Z.)” and postmarked April 24, 1944.
185 SAA, Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, inv. no. 6575: report police station Overtoom, June 4, 1944, mut. 10.10 am and 10.00 pm.
186 AFS, AFC, dossier “Staatsanwaltschaft/Proces 1964”: German transcript statement E.A. Tafelkruijer-Olofssen, December 18, 1945. The amounts are confirmed from a search at Police Headquarters SAA, Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, inv. no. 7202: fouilleringsregister [search register] June 5, 1944, mut. 6.10 pm.
harassed, was the father of the future journalist Jules Huf. Huf Jr. was the first reporter to visit Silberbauer in 1963.

— June 27, 1944: Silberbauer arrests W. O. Sklarek, Jewish but in a mixed marriage.

Sklarek came to the Netherlands from Germany around 1920 and married a Dutch woman. Thanks to this marriage, as a Jew during the German occupation, he was not in direct danger of being deported. However, he helped many others, and his arrest was related to these illegal activities. The later Dutch Minister of Justice, Ivo Samkalden, saw Sklarek’s resistance activities as enough of a reason for his children to be granted free naturalization. A family member by marriage remembers that Sklarek’s daughter, who was present when her father was arrested, told them that they always had illegal newspapers and ration coupons at home. Sklarek was on the same transport to Westerbork and to Auschwitz as the inhabitants of the Secret Annex. He died in the sickbay barrack at Auschwitz concentration camp, according to the wartime records of the Red Cross, in January 1945.

— June 30, 1944: Silberbauer arrests Eliazar Schaap, Jewish but in a mixed marriage.

Schaap lived on Banstraat in the south of Amsterdam and ran a business, on Kromme Waal in the center of the city, that traded in old metal. His business partner was the brother of his non-Jewish wife. The documents available are not very explicit, but it seems that Silberbauer suspected him of the unauthorized continuation of his business under a different name. Moreover, he supposedly had a radio, which was prohibited. The incriminating information originated from the SD in The Hague. Silberbauer handled this case with Grootendorst. Schaap died early in 1945 in Auschwitz.


As far as known, this is only one of two cases Silberbauer was involved in where people in hiding were arrested.

— On (or around) August 18, 1944: Silberbauer participates in a coordinated action against activities such as an illegal radio transmitter and a clandestine printing shop in Zeist.

The case was set in motion by Pieter Schaap and Ans van Dijk. During this action, at different addresses, Jews in hiding were also discovered. According to another SD officer on the case named Otto Kempin, Silberbauer was basically added to the SD squad. Kempin later declared to the Rijksrecherche about this case:

Related to this, it struck me that I couldn’t remember at first – but I now know for sure that at the time there was no reason to think there were Jews hiding at the addresses indicated.

So according to Kempin, also this action that Silberbauer was involved in was not specifically directed at finding Jews in hiding.


188 SAA, Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, inv. no. 2046: report police station Linnaeusstraat, June 27, 1944, mut. 11 pm.


190 Telephone conversation Gertjan Broek with Wanda Sklarek and Mrs. Sklarek-Dubbeldam, July 23, 2015.


192 www.joodsmonument.nl/person/532477/nl (consulted October 2015).


August and/or September 1944: Silberbauer intervenes in Louise Saaf-Redl’s case.

Louise Saaf was arrested on August 2, 1944 by the Devisenschutzkommando (Foreign Exchange Protection Commando) for safekeeping valuables belonging to her Jewish acquaintances. Although she established that she had these items in trust before the war, she was still imprisoned. Her husband, who had heard that Silberbauer came from Vienna, sought his help. Vienna was his wife’s birthplace, where they had gotten married, and the couple had lived there for years. Under the motto “one Viennese helps another” he tried to convince Silberbauer to do what he could for his wife. Although she was still sent to prison for a few weeks, according to Saaf, Silberbauer intervened to speed up her release.195

Arnold Caffé; exactly when is not known.

In 1963, Silberbauer told reporter Jules Huf of De Telegraaf about the good relationship he had with the Jewish banker Arnold Caffé, who lived on Tintorettostraat in the south of Amsterdam. He supposedly visited Caffé at least six times in uniform.196 Silberbauer was not clear about how this information might work in his favor, but it can be deduced from these visits that Caffé was still living in his own home, so he was not in hiding.197

In September 1941, after receiving an anonymous tip, the police arrested Caffé for widespread dealing in black market cigarettes. During the investigation, a large haul of illegally slaughtered meat was also seized.198 At the time, Silberbauer had not yet started working in the Netherlands. Early in May 1944, Caffé was arrested again and locked up at police headquarters in Amsterdam.199 He survived the war.200 Whether Silberbauer was involved in this second arrest is not known due to a lack of source material.

196 “LAGES noemde mij een Oostenrijkse zwakkeling” (LAGES Called Me An Austrian Weakling), De Telegraaf, November 21, 1963.
198 SAA, Gemeentepolitie [Municipal Police] Amsterdam, inv. nr. 6379: report police station Marnixstraat, September 2, 1941, mut. 1.50 pm.
199 SAA, Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam, inv. no. 7201: fou illeringsregister (search log) May 4, 1944, 6.30 pm.
200 SAA, Dienst Bevolkingsregister, entry no. 30238: archive card A. Caffé.
Appendix II — Archives and Collections

To make the footnotes more accessible to the reader, a corresponding English translation of each listing has been added below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Listing</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anne Frank Stichting (AFS) / Anne House (AFH)</td>
<td>Anne Frank Collectie (AFC) / Anne Frank Collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsches Literaturarchiv (Marbach am Neckar)</td>
<td>Collectie E. Schnabel / German Literature Archive in Marbach, Collection E. Schnabel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historisch Centrum Overijssel (HCO) / Overijssel Historical Society</td>
<td>0108.2 Arrondissementsrechtbank en Parket van de Officier van Justitie te Zwolle, 1940-'49 / District Court and Office of the Public Prosecutor, Zwolle 1940-'49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0725 Gemeentepolitie Zwolle / Municipal Police Zwolle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NL-HaNa) / National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague</td>
<td>2.09.09 Centraal Archief Bijzondere Rechtspleging / Central Archives for Special Criminal Jurisdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.09.54 Justitie/Zuivering Politie / (Dutch Ministry of) Justice/Purging (of the postwar) Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.13.25 Militair Gezag / Dutch Postwar Military Authority (1944-1945)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlandse Rode Kruis, oorlogsarchieven / The Netherlands Red Cross, Archive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime Documentation Persoonsdossiers / Personal Files</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIOD Instituut voor oorlogs-, holocaust en genocidestudies (NIOD) / Netherland's Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173 Boekhandel en Sigarenbedrijf de Driehoek / The Triangle Bookstore and Cigar Company (started printing material for the NSB and other National-Socialist organizations in 1936)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212c Archief Anne Frank / Anne Frank Archive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noord-Hollands Archief (NHA) / North-Holland Archives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411 Arrondissementsrechtbank Haarlem 1940-'49 / District Court Haarlem 1940-'49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412 Parket van de Officier van Justitie 1929-1949 / Office of the Public Prosecutor 1929-1949</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privécollecties / Private Collections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documenten in bezit van de families Hofhuis en Polder / Documents belonging to the Hofhuis and Polder families</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stadsarchief Amsterdam (SAA) / Amsterdam City Archives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5181 Secretarie: afdeling Algemene Zaken / Secretariat: Municipal Department of General Affairs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5225 Gemeentepolitie Amsterdam / Municipal Police Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5445 Dienst Bevolkingsregister: woningkaarten / Municipal Population Register: official residence cards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30238 Dienst Bevolkingsregister: gezinskaart en archiefkaarten / Municipal Population Register: family cards and archive cards</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wiener Stadt- und Landesarchiv (Wenen, Oostenrijk) / Vienna City and Land Archives (Vienna, Austria)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volksgericht beim Landesgericht für Strafsachen [So-called People’s Court at the Regional Court in Vienna: related to crimes committed during WWII], Vg (Volksgericht) Vr (Verfahren / Legal Proceeding) 288/52.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

33
Appendix III — Bibliography

[If a publication has never been released in English, for the reader’s benefit, a title translation appears after the foreign title.]

Titles of foreign books below translated into English follow after the bibliography.

Barnouw, David, Het fenomeen Anne Frank [The Anne Frank Phenomenon], Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2012.
Frank, Anne, Verzameld werk [Collected Work], published under the auspices of the Anne Frank Fonds Basel, Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2013.
Groen, Koos, Als slachtoffers daders worden. De zaak van de joodse verraadster Ans van Dijk [When Victims Became Perpetrators, the Case of the Jewish Informant Ans van Dijk], Baarn: Ambo, 1994.
Ledenlijst van de Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Amsterdam [Members of the National-Socialist Movement (NSB) in Amsterdam], Amsterdam: Politieke Opsporingsdienst (POD) 1945.
Luchtbeschermingsdienst Gemeente Amsterdam 1939-1945 [Amsterdam Air Raid Civil Defense Service 1939-1945], Amsterdam, ± 1945.

Some of the (foreign-language) publications above have also been released in English:
Anne Frank. De biografie / Anne Frank, The Biography (1998)
Moordenaars onder ons / Murderers Among Us (2009)
Spur eines Kindes / A Portrait in Courage (1958) / In the Footsteps of Anne Frank (2015)
www.niod.nl/sites/niod.nl/files/WhobetrayedAnneFrank.pdf
Appendix IV — Dutch Periodicals

Amigoe di Curaçao, weekly colonial newspaper founded by Dominican Friars in 1883; became Amigoe in 1941: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amigoe](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amigoe)

Reformatorisch Dagblad, Dutch Protestant newspaper


De Tijd, Dutch Catholic weekly


De Zwolesche en Overijsselsche Courant, Dutch regional newspaper until 2003

Het Vaderland, newspaper until 1992

Het Volk, started as a Socialist newspaper


Utrechtsch Nieuwsblad, newspaper until 1981

Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal / Record of Actions Taken by the Lower House of Dutch Parliament
Appendix V — External Experts

On May 7, 2015, an “experts” meeting was held at the AFH where a small group of researchers discussed different theories and findings. The participants were Koos Groen, Marie-Cecile Hintum, Ad van Liempt, Inger Schaap, and Sytze van der Zee. Wichert ten Have, Erika Prins, Teresien da Silva, and Gertjan Broek also participated on behalf of the Anne Frank House. Notes of that meeting and a complete audio recording of the gathering are available (in Dutch only) at the AFH.

Additionally, whenever the AFH asked, David Barnouw, Gerrold van der Stroom, and Guus Meershoek shared their valuable observations about aspects of this investigative report. The Anne Frank Houses wishes to express its gratitude to them for their assistance.
Appendix VI — Internet Sources

If a website below is also available in English, the link appears.
www.afdr.eu.pn (only in English)
www.joodsmonument.nl / www.joodsmonument.nl/en/
www.parlement.com
www.statengeneraaldigitaal.nl

Thanks to the progress of digitization, an increasing number of sources are accessible online and searchable. Besides the websites indicated above, various newspapers and periodicals referred to in this report are available via:
www.amsterdam.nl/stadsarchief/
www.delpher.nl
www.digibron.nl
www.hetutrechtsarchief.nl / www.hetutrechtsarchief.nl/english
www.nationaalbrandweerdocumentatiecentrum.nl
www.niod.nl / www.niod.nl/en
www.volkskrant.nl